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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
 
D.L. v. SHEPPARD PRATT HEALTH SYSTEM, INC.: A JUVENILE’S 
POST-RELEASE PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW IS NOT 
MOOT DUE TO COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES STEMMING 
FROM INVOLUNTARY ADMISSION.  
 
By: Cooper Gerus 
 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a petition for judicial review 
of an involuntary admission to a mental health facility is not moot when 
possible collateral consequences flow from such admissions. D.L. v. 
Sheppard Pratt Health Sys., Inc., 465 Md. 339, 342, 214 A.3d 521, 522 
(2019).  D.L. faced possible collateral consequences, including the impact of 
her involuntary admission on future employment outcomes and court 
proceedings, her ability to own firearms and obtain a driver’s license, and the 
social stigmatization associated with mental illness. Id. at 377-78, 214 A.3d 
at 543-44.  The court ultimately remanded D.L.’s case to the circuit court to 
determine whether “no less restrictive” treatment was available. Id. at 346-
47, 214 A.3d at 525.  
     In March 2015, D.L., a fourteen-year-old in the custody of the Department 
of Social Services (“DSS”), was taken to MedStar Southern Maryland 
Hospital to be treated for self-inflicted wounds.  She was diagnosed with 
depressive disorder.  The doctors determined that D.L. presented a danger to 
herself and others and that admission to an institutional inpatient care and 
treatment facility was necessary.  D.L. was brought to Sheppard Pratt-Ellicott 
City (“Sheppard Pratt”) on March 26, 2015.  D.L. could not be voluntarily 
admitted because she was in the care and custody of DSS, and required an 
involuntary commitment hearing conducted by an administrative law judge 
(“ALJ”) to determine whether there were less restrictive means of treatment 
available to D.L. At the hearing, the record reflected that DSS attempted to 
place D.L. in a less restrictive facility.  D.L. had been placed in a psychiatric 
facility once before, though it was unclear whether the prior admission had 
been involuntary, or whether she was voluntarily admitted by a parent or 
guardian.  None of the alternative facilities had open beds, so the ALJ ordered 
D.L. to be involuntarily admitted at Sheppard Pratt, where she stayed from 
March 26, 2015, to April 10, 2015.  
     Once released, D.L. filed a petition for judicial review of the ALJ’s 
decision in the Circuit Court for Howard County on May 1, 2015.  The circuit 
court granted Sheppard Pratt’s motion to dismiss D.L.’s petition on July 28, 
2015, without holding a hearing on the merits.  D.L. then appealed to the 
Court of Special Appeals.  The court dismissed D.L.’s petition as moot and 
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held that any collateral consequences of her present admission already existed 
due to her prior admission to a psychiatric facility.  D.L. filed a petition for a 
writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, which was granted. 
    The court considered de novo whether the Court of Special Appeals erred 
in finding D.L.’s challenge to involuntary admission was moot, and that no 
mootness exceptions applied.  D.L., 465 Md. at 350, 214 A.3d at 527.  D.L.’s 
only contention in her petition for review was that there might have been a 
less restrictive form of intervention available.  Id. at 351, 214 A.3d at 528; 
Health-General Article (“HG”) § 10-617(a)(5). 
     The court began by noting that the presumption of mootness arises when 
no judicable case or controversy exists between the parties, and a reviewing 
court is at risk of rendering an advisory opinion.  D.L., 465 Md. at 352, 214 
A.3d at 528 (citing In re Kaela C., 394 Md. 432, 452, 906 A.2d 915 (2006); 
Adkins v. State, 324 Md. 641, 646, 598 A.2d 194 (1991)).  In order to 
overcome mootness, a petitioner must demonstrate that “collateral 
consequences flow from a lower court’s decision.”  Id. at 352, 214 A.3d at 
528 (citing Adkins, 324 Md. at 645–46, 598 A.2d at 194).  The court analyzed 
the collateral consequences of D.L.’s involuntary admission to Sheppard 
Pratt.  Id. at 352, 214 A.3d at 528.  The court analyzed Supreme Court 
precedent, then reviewed the doctrine of collateral consequences under 
Maryland law. Id.  
     In Fiswick v. United States, the Supreme Court developed what would be 
known as the doctrine of collateral consequences.  D.L., 465 Md. at 353, 214 
A.3d at 529 (citing Fiswick, 329 U.S. 211, 213 (1946)).  The Court cited civil 
consequences flowing from a criminal conviction such as the risk of 
deportation, impact on voting rights, and the ability to sit on a jury or hold 
public office.  Id.  These consequences did not render a petition for review 
moot despite the petitioner’s release from custody.  Id.   
     In Pollard v. United States, the Court held the mere possibility of 
collateral consequences flowing from a disposition justified a post-release 
hearing on the merits.  Id. at 354, 214 A.3d at 530 (citing Pollard, 352 U.S. 
354, 358 (1957)).  In Carafas v. LaVallee, the Court held that an appeal is not 
moot when statutorily imposed disabilities and burdens outlast a criminal 
conviction.  Id. at 355, 214 A.3d at 530 (citing Carafas, 391 U.S. 234, 237–
38 (1968)).  The doctrine was limited in Lane v. Williams where the Court, 
reinforcing Carafas, held that discretionary, non-statutory consequences do 
not overcome mootness. Id. at 355-56, 214 A.3d at 531 (citing Lane, 455 U.S. 
624, 632-33 (1982)).  Such consequences include decisions by employers or 
judges in future proceedings.  Id.  
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland identified several circumstances 
which, while not concrete or actual, implicate possible collateral 
consequences to overcome mootness.  D.L., 465 Md. at 357, 214 A.3d at 531 
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(citing Adkins, 324 Md. at 654, 598 A.2d 194).  For example, the collateral 
consequences of a prior disposition may impact a petitioner in future child 
custody proceedings.  Id. at 357, 214 A.3d at 531 (citing In re Kaela C., 394 
Md. at 475–76, 906 A.2d 915).   They also may restrict one’s driving 
privileges, access to employment opportunities, ability to serve on a federal 
jury, join the military, and own firearms.  Id. at 358, 214 A.3d at 532 (citing 
Kranz v. State, 459 Md. 456, 473, 187 A.3d 66 (2018); Toler v. Motor Vehicle 
Admin., 373 Md. 214, 216, 817 A.2d 229 (2003)).  Involuntary admissions 
may impact statutory reporting requirements, immigration status, future 
admission proceedings, and impose the social stigma associated with 
involuntary admission and mental illness.  D.L., 456 Md. at 360-61, 214 A.3d 
at 533-534.  The court reviewed each collateral consequence as it applied to 
D.L.  Id. at 360, 214 A.3d at 533.  
     The court found that statutorily imposed collateral consequences to D.L.’s 
driving privileges exist under TA § 16-103.1(3), which bars anyone with a 
mental disorder from obtaining a driver’s license without being adjudged 
“competent.”  D.L., 465 Md. at 361, 214 A.3d at 534.  The court also 
considered collateral consequences in future guardianship and child custody 
proceedings.  D.L., 465 Md. at 365, 214 A.3d at 536.  Local agencies are 
required to compile a report on a guardian’s suitability, which would uncover 
past involuntary admissions.  Id.  The court found that D.L. faces no collateral 
consequences in future naturalization proceedings, but that such inquiries are 
case-specific and could impact other individuals.  Id. at 367, 214 A.3d at 537.   
     The court also discussed the impact of an involuntary admission on D.L.’s 
employment prospects.  Id. at 362, 214 A.3d at 534.  Sheppard Pratt asserted 
that employment regulations, which are not an outright ban, mitigate any 
collateral consequences, rendering her petition moot.  Id.  Contrarily, the 
court emphasized that the mere possibility of collateral consequences 
overcomes mootness and that statutory regulations are insufficient mitigators.  
Id. at 363, 214 A.3d at 535.   
     The court reached a similar conclusion concerning collateral 
consequences in future involuntary admission proceedings, noting that while 
HG § 10-632(e) limits the use of prior involuntary admissions, it does not 
completely bar their introduction in future proceedings.  Id. at 370-71, 214 
A.3d at 539-40.  The court again found that D.L. faced collateral 
consequences concerning firearm ownership and found that though statutes 
limit when information concerning D.L.’s involuntary admission could be 
used in purchasing them, any mitigation here would be “ad hoc.”  Id. at 370-
76, 214 A.3d at 539-43.  Finally, although D.L. had been previously admitted 
to a facility, it was unclear whether this was an involuntary admission.  Id. at 
380, 214 A.3d at 545.  Had it been a voluntary admission, D.L. would face 
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no collateral consequences.  Id.  Since her March 2015 admission was 
involuntary, D.L. faces collateral consequences.  Id.  
     In D.L. v. Sheppard Pratt, the court held that D.L. faces possible collateral 
consequences flowing from her involuntary admission, which render her 
petition for judicial review not moot.  Mootness inquiries are highly fact-
specific; each case requires a focused analysis as to whether collateral 
consequences stem from a lower court’s disposition. Such inquiries are 
particularly relevant in cases concerning minors and among individuals in 
psychiatric facilities, because the impact of a disposition may extend beyond 
the proceedings to the rest of a person’s life. This decision further clarifies 
the situations in which mootness could be raised and may lead to an extension 
of the collateral consequences doctrine to other areas of law.                                                                                                                            
